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INTRODUCTION
Courts have consistently struggled with the conflicting policy
goals of environmental and bankruptcy law. 1 Without Supreme Court
guidance, lower courts have resorted to what has been deemed a caseby-case approach of balancing these competing interests. 2 The
cauldron of bankruptcy and environmental issues has been bubbling
for some time and has now reached a boiling point. 3 The response
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2011, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A., University of Notre Dame.
1
See Robert E. August, Environmental Claims in Bankruptcy, 1 S.C. ENVTL.
L.J. 72, 72 (1992).
2
Id. at 80.
3
In 1986, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated that during
the next fifty years, voluntary bankruptcy petitions would be filed by twenty-three to
thirty percent of the owners or operators of waste disposal facilities. U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE: ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS
JEOPARDIZED WHEN FACILITIES CEASE OPERATING 18 (1986), available at
http://archive.gao.gov/d13t3/129359.pdf [hereinafter U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE]. Today, the EPA estimates that one in four Americans lives within three
miles of a hazardous waste site. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
SUPERFUND: FUNDING AND REPORTED COSTS OF ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION ACTIVITIES 4 (2008), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08841r.pdf [hereinafter U.S. GOV’T
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from Congress and the Supreme Court, however, has been virtually
non-existent. 4
Metaphors of Homeric proportions have been written about the
state of environmental claims in bankruptcy, describing the competing
interests as a veritable “clash of titans” of law and policy with
conflicting priorities. 5 A debtor cannot get a fresh start as well as pay
for environmental obligations.6 A cleanup order cannot be treated
comparably with other injunctive relief while receiving administrative
priority. 7
The Seventh Circuit recently commented on one of the many
unresolved issues plaguing the intersection of environmental law and
bankruptcy—the discharge of injunction orders under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). 8 This Note discusses the
current circuit split representing the different ways that courts have
defined rights to payment under section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy
Code 9 and the Seventh Circuit’s definitive holding in United States vs.
Apex Oil Company, Inc. 10 First, this Note argues that the Seventh
Circuit’s holding, that the environmental obligation at issue in Apex
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE]. Litigation costs, including bankruptcy issues, comprise
between $25 million and $50 million annually. Id. at 14.
4
Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger & Michael G. Hillinger, Environmental Affairs in
Bankruptcy: 2004, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 331, 333 (2004).
5
Jill Thompson Losch, Comment, Bankruptcy v. Environmental Obligation:
Clash of the Titans, 52 LA. L. REV. 137, 137 (1991).
6
See Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 509
(1986).
7
Courts are divided on whether environmental cleanup costs should receive
administrative priority. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 112 B.R. 513, 526 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (“cleanup costs assessed post-petition where there has been a pre-petition
release or threatened release of hazardous waste are entitled to an administrative
priority under the Bankruptcy Code”). Contra In re Security Gas & Oil, Inc., 70 B.R.
786, 795 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (“[a] duty to clean up an environmental hazard created
pre-petition is generally not one of the obligations entitled to priority under the
Bankruptcy Code”).
8
See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act [hereinafter RCRA], 42 U.S.C.
§ 6902(b) (2006); United States v. Apex Oil Co., Inc., 579 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2009).
9
11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2006).
10
Apex, 579 F.3d at 734.
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was not a “right to payment” and hence not dischargeable in
bankruptcy, is the correct interpretation of the bankruptcy provision as
well as the environmental statute. This Note then discusses the
implications of the Seventh Circuit’s holding and the several equitable
concerns that remain in the wake of the court’s decision.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Environmental Law and Policy
State and federal environmental laws generally have as their
purpose the regulation and elimination of dangerous pollution. 11 To
effectuate broad statutory mandates, environmental laws vest the
President, and thus the EPA, with extensive power. 12 Among its
preventative and remedial functions, the EPA has a continuing duty to
identify sites releasing hazardous substances. 13 The sites, ranked in
order of priority, comprise the National Priorities List (NPL). 14
Environmental statutes also work retroactively, with expansive
liability provisions that reach third parties, including parent
companies, shareholders, corporate successors and lenders. 15 Common
11

See, e.g. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b) (2006) (endeavoring to further the
Congressional policy of minimizing the present and future threat to human health
and the environment posed by solid and hazardous wastes).
12
Exec. Order No. 12, 580, § 1(b)(1), 52 Fed. Reg. 2,923 (Jan. 23, 1987),
reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 9615 note at 291–95 (1993); see Kelley v. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 15 F.3d 1100, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (President has delegated primary
authority for enforcement and direct remedial action regarding environmental
statutes to the EPA).
13
Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1003.
14
Id. Through the end of the 2007 fiscal year, the EPA classified 1,569 sites as
NPL sites, from a list of over 47,000 hazardous waste sites potentially requiring
cleanup actions. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 4.
15
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(hereinafter CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675, 9607(a) (2006); see United States
v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 67 (1998) (parent company may be charged with
derivative CERCLA liability for its subsidiary’s actions); Browning-Ferris Indus. of
Ill., Inc. v. Ter Maat, 195 F.3d 953, 955–56 (7th Cir. 1999) (shareholder not
immunized from CERCLA liability where he personally operated polluting landfill);
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remedies for environmental claims include—depending on the
statute—clean-up orders, civil penalties, and criminal sanctions
against responsible parties. 16
Generally, environmental laws authorize one or more of three
courses of action. First, the government can undertake clean-up
actions, including removal and remedial measures. 17 Where the
response is contingent with the National Contingency Plan, the costs
of the cleanup actions are subsidized by the Hazardous Substances
Fund. 18 Second, the government can order abatement actions and
assess penalties for non-compliance. 19 Third, where the government or
a private party undertakes the environmental cleanup or expends funds
for it, a cost-recovery action may be brought against Potentially
Responsible Parties (PRP). 20
Although there are many federal and state statutes, two are
particularly relevant: the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the RCRA. 21
CERCLA was enacted in 1980 to address the problem of
remediating abandoned waste sites by establishing legal liability as
Cytec Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 196 F. Supp. 2d 644, 654 (6th Cir. 2002)
(successor corporation liable under CERCLA where there has been a formal or de
facto merger).
16
See Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 936 (8th Cir. 1995)
(defendant dry-cleaning supply business liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA for
release of hazardous chemicals); U.S. v. Tex-Tow, 589 F.2d 1310, 1315 (7th Cir.
1978) (defendant owners of tank barge liable under Clean Water Act for civil
penalties under absolute liability standard); U.S. v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 109 (6th
Cir. 1977) (defendant could properly be charged with criminal sanctions for willfully
discharging gasoline into navigable waterway).
17
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (2006).
18
Id.
19
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1) (2006).
20
Section 9607 defines four classes of PRP: (1) current owner and operator; (2)
anyone who owned or operated the site at the time of the release of toxic substances;
(3) any person who transported toxic substances to or from the site; and (4) any
person who accepted transported toxic substances from the site. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a) (2006).
21
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6987
(2006).

166
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol6/iss1/6

4

Rdzanek: Discharge of RCRA Injunctive Claims in Bankruptcy: The Seventh Ci

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 6, Issue 1

Fall 2010

well as a trust fund for environmental cleanup. 22 CERCLA’s primary
purpose is to effectuate cleanup of toxic waste sites or to compensate
those who have attended to remediation of environmental hazards. 23
CERCLA establishes a complicated scheme that enables the federal
government to respond promptly and effectively to the pervasive
problems inherent in hazardous waste disposal. 24 Ultimately,
CERCLA promotes the private allocation of responsibility for costs
incurred in responding to threatened or actual releases, spills, or
discharges of hazardous substances at existing or abandoned sites by
laying liability at the feet of a broadly defined PRP. 25
RCRA is a comprehensive statute that governs the treatment,
storage, and disposal of solid and hazardous waste. 26 RCRA creates a
“cradle to grave” regulatory framework for managing hazardous
wastes by imposing compliance requirements on both generators and

22

See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6119, 6128 (noting that bill would establish program for appropriate environmental
response to protect public health and induce persons to voluntarily take remedial
measures); Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 4, at 334.
23
Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 4, at 334–35.
24
A prima facie case for cost recovery under CERCLA is satisfied by
establishing the following four elements: (1) the site is a facility as defined under
CERCLA; (2) a release of hazardous substances has occurred or been threatened; (3)
the release has caused the plaintiff to incur necessary costs of response; and (4) the
defendant falls within one of the four categories of potentially responsible persons
(PRPs). See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil
Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152–54 (9th Cir. 1989).
25
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006).
26
Hazardous waste is defined in § 6903 as:
a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its
quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious
characteristics may (A) cause, or significantly contribute to an
increase in mortality or an increase in serious, irreversible, or
incapacitating reversible, illness; or (B) pose a substantial present
or potential hazard to human health or the environment when
improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or
otherwise managed.
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6903 (2006).
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transporters of hazardous wastes, as well as owners and operators of
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. 27
Unlike CERCLA, RCRA's primary purpose is to reduce the
generation of hazardous waste and to ensure proper treatment, storage,
and disposal of waste that is nonetheless generated so as to minimize
present and future threats to human health and environment. 28 This
difference in purpose is reflected in the remedial structures of the two
statutes. 29 RCRA claims are unique because they do not authorize any
form of monetary relief and are purely injunctive. 30
B. Bankruptcy Law and Policy
The bankrupt debtor’s position has been likened to being stuck
among a “circling flock of creditors who would otherwise feast
merrily on the debtor's carcass, with the swiftest among them realizing
the choicest cuts.” 31 To prevent a race to the courthouse, maximize the
debtor’s assets, and preserve judicial order, there exist several
procedural mechanisms by which debtors’ assets are liquidated or
reorganized. 32 The Bankruptcy Code aims to balance the dual goals of
giving creditors what they are owed and providing debtors with a fresh
economic start. 33
The “fresh start” principle is primarily achieved through two
mechanisms: the automatic stay and the bankruptcy discharge. 34 The
27

See Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994).
Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 4, at 359.
29
See Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996).
30
See Jean Buo-Lin Chen Fung, Note, KFC Western, Inc., v. Meghrig: The
Merits and Implications of Awarding Restitution to Citizen Plaintiffs Under RCRA
§ 6972(a)(1)(B), 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 785, 798 (1995) (describing the court’s equitable
power to issue mandatory injunctions, even those that require the expenditure of
money to perform).
31
Jill Thompson Losch, Comment, Bankruptcy v. Environmental Obligation:
Clash of the Titans, 52 LA. L. REV. 137, 141–42 (1991).
32
Id.
33
See Katherine Porter & Dr. Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s
Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 68–71 (2006).
34
Id.
28
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automatic stay stops creditors from being able to collect debts from the
moment the bankruptcy is filed to the conclusion of the bankruptcy
case. 35 The automatic stay protects the debtor’s assets throughout the
bankruptcy, guarantees that creditors will receive a fair share of the
assets, and prevents the proverbial race to the courthouse to file
creditor claims. 36 In essence, because the costs of litigating judicial
claims against the debtor often deplete the estate, the main purpose of
the automatic stay provision is to preserve the estate. 37
The most important mechanism provided to debtors to achieve
a fresh start is the bankruptcy discharge. 38 Except as otherwise
provided in the Bankruptcy Code, a discharge in bankruptcy relieves
the debtor from all debts that arose before bankruptcy. 39 Individuals
filing under Chapter 7 are discharged of all pre-petition debts, save for
limited exceptions provided in the Bankruptcy Code. 40 In a Chapter 11
bankruptcy, confirmation of a plan of reorganization discharges the
debtor, usually a corporation, from all debts arising prior to the date of
confirmation. 41
Section 1141(d)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that
confirmation of a claim discharges “any debt that arose before the date
of” confirmation of the bankruptcy. 42 Debt is defined as liability on a
claim. 43 The Code further defines a claim as follows:
35

Losch, supra note 31, at 143.
See United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 1988); H.R.
REP. NO. 95-595, at 133-39 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5973–74.
37
Kathryn R. Heidt, The Automatic Stay in Environmental Bankruptcies, 67
AM. BANKR. L. J. 69, 93 (1993).
38
Section 1328 of the Bankruptcy Code expressly provides a discharge of all
allowable debts: “the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided
for by the plan or disallowed under section 502 of this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)
(2006) (emphasis added).
39
Id.
40
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2006). Nondischargeable claims include child
support, judgments for accidents involving drunk driving, certain taxes, and debts
incurred illegally or by fraud.
41
11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (2006).
42
Id.
43
Id. § 101(12). For purposes of identifying claims, federal bankruptcy, rather
than state law, applies. See In re Jensen, 995 F.2d 925, 930 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993)
36
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(A) [a] right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced
to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent,
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable,
secured, or unsecured; or
(B) [a] right to an equitable remedy for breach of
performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment,
whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to
judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, secured, or unsecured. 44
Congress expressed its clear intention that the definition of claim be
interpreted broadly, stating “the bill contemplates that all legal
obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be
able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case.”45
The usual interpretation of section 101(5)(B) is that if a holder
of an equitable claim cannot obtain an equitable remedy but can obtain
a money judgment instead, then the claim is dischargeable. 46 The
seemingly simple statutory interpretation has been complicated by the
inconsistent judicial history of equitable claims in bankruptcy. A claim
arises, for bankruptcy purposes, “when ‘the relationship between the
debtor and creditor contain[s] all of the elements necessary to give rise
to a legal obligation . . . under the relevant non-bankruptcy law.’” 47

(quoting Arlene Elgart Mirsky et al., The Interface Between Bankruptcy and
Environmental Laws, 46 BUS. LAW. 623, 651 (1991)) (“The determination of when a
claim arises for purposes of bankruptcy law should be a matter of federal bankruptcy
law and should not be governed by the particular state or nonCode federal law giving
rise to the claim. The reason for this is that the Code definition of ‘claim’ expressly
includes rights to payment or equitable relief that are unmatured or unliquidated.
Most state or nonCode federal statutes are only concerned with claims that have
matured or been liquidated”).
44
11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A)–(B).
45
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 309, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266.
46
United States v. Apex Oil Co., Inc., 579 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 2009).
47
In re Duplan Corp., 212 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Chateaugay
Corp., 53 F.3d 478, 497 (2d Cir. 1995).
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The relevant non-bankruptcy legal obligation must arise prior to the
filing of the bankruptcy petition. 48
The bankruptcy discharge is primarily associated with Chapter
7 debtors who liquidate their assets in exchange for relief from the
burden of their debts, but is an equally important principle for debtors
attempting reorganization under Chapter 11. 49 Reorganization under
Chapter 11 is most often used by debtors who wish to continue doing
business but cannot meet obligations to their creditors. 50 Chapter 11
reorganization provides payments to the debtor’s creditors in
accordance with a reorganization plan submitted to the creditors for
vote and approved by the bankruptcy court. 51 In a Chapter 11
reorganization, debtors plan the repayment of their debts with the
expectation that their debts will be discharged. 52 Consequently, the
guarantee of dischargeability is important for debtors who are trying to
determine how best to dispose of bad debt and restructure the rest of
their obligations for future financial health.53
Outside of the bankruptcy discharge, the bankruptcy courts
have general equitable powers under section 105 of the Bankruptcy
Code, which states: “the court may issue any order, process, or
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of
the title.” 54 The court may thus enjoin any action where it is
appropriate. 55
As a general rule, when Congress empowers the federal courts
to grant equitable remedies, the courts are presumed to be authorized
to exercise their full equitable authority unless Congress clearly

48

See In re Nat’l Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397, 405 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
Debra L. Baker, Bankruptcy—the Last Environmental Loophole?, 34 S. TEX.
L. REV. 379, 385 (1993).
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
See Brett Ludwig, Comment, In re De Laurentiis Entertainment Group:
Sacrificing Confirmed Chapter 11 Plans to Delinquently Asserted Setoff Rights, 77
MINN. L. REV. 871, 876–77 (1993).
53
Id. at 877.
54
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006).
55
Heidt, supra note 37, at 80.
49
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indicates otherwise. 56 This equitable authority includes the power to
order prohibitory and mandatory injunctions, writs of mandamus, and
restitutionary damages. 57 Courts are limited in their broad discretion
from awarding compensatory or punitive damages. 58
Claims for contribution to environmental cleanup costs clearly
fall within the scope of section 105(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. 59
Such claims are, by their very nature, rights to payment. 60
Environmental injunctions, on the other hand, are a form of equitable
remedy that fall within the scope of section 105(B). 61 In contrast to
claims under section 105(A), which are rights to payment by
definition, not all injunctions are rights to payment. 62
Although environmental injunctions may differ significantly in
both form and cost from other equitable relief, public policy
supporting environmental cleanup does not require that environmental
claims be treated differently from other claims in bankruptcy, in
absence of clear legislative intent. 63
C. Conflicts
The tension between bankruptcy and environmental principles
is evident in the goals and obligations of the respective parties. 64 The
Bankruptcy Code aims to repay creditors while providing debtors with
a fresh economic start. 65 In contrast, environmental regulations
56

See 11 U.S.C. § 105(d)(2) (2006).
Randall James Butterfield, Recovering Environmental Cleanup Costs Under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act: A Potential Solution to a Persistent
Problem, 49 VAND. L. REV. 689, 736 (1996).
58
Id. at 737.
59
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006).
60
See Bos. & Me. Corp. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 587 F. 3d 89, 100 (1st
Cir. 2009).
61
11 U.S.C. § 105(b) (2006).
62
See Matter of Udell, 18 F.3d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1994) (employer’s right to an
injunction preventing a former employee from violating a covenant not to compete
was not a claim under section 105(a)).
63
See In re Jensen, 127 B.R. 27, 33 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991).
64
Losch, supra note 31, at 144.
65
See Porter & Thorne, supra note 33, at 68.
57
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generally seek to protect public safety and the environment regardless
of the particular interests of debtors and creditors. 66 While this
admittedly oversimplifies the conflict between bankruptcy and
environmental laws, it is at precisely this crossroads that courts must
determine whether the bankruptcy discharge applies to environmental
injunctions.
When the bankrupt debtor is also a polluter under CERCLA or
another environmental statute, the policy considerations of
environmental and bankruptcy laws collide. 67 A debtor with limited
assets must, in a bankruptcy, distribute his assets according to priority
of claim against him. 68 An ideally positioned unsecured creditor
would benefit from administrative expense status. 69 However, because
many environmental obligations are enormous financial burdens,
giving those claims administrative priority effectively dwarfs all other
unsecured claims. 70 Such priority status helps the environmental
enforcement agencies, but it may ruin a debtor’s attempts at
reorganization. 71 Where the environmental claims are given a larger
share of the debtor’s assets, this inevitably leaves less to repay other
creditors who receive a diminished share. 72
On the contrary, when environmental obligations are pooled
with other general, unsecured claims, they are often discharged for
pennies on the dollar. 73 Discharging unpaid liability undermines the
goals of environmental laws to force parties responsible for
contamination to clean up the polluted sites. 74
66

Losch, supra note 31, at 144–45.
Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 4, at 371.
68
Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2006). Priority claims are ordered as follows: (1)
domestic support obligations; (2) administrative expenses; (3) “claims” as defined in
section 502; (4) payment of wages to corporate debtors’ employees; (5) contributions
to employee benefit plans; (6) claims related to grain storage and fishing; (7) certain
deposits for real and personal property; and (8) certain taxes.
69
Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 4, at 390.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
August, supra note 1, at 74.
73
Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 4, at 390.
74
Id.
67
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Bankruptcy issues that prevent or delay enforcement of
environmental statutes can greatly increase the expenditures related to
cleanup for those sites. 75 Litigation and negotiation costs are largely
site-specific, and the small number of sites with bankrupt PRPs can
astronomically raise the overall level of spending on litigation. 76
Further issues arise in situations where there are multiple
responsible parties at a given cleanup site. Bankrupt parties who
cannot contribute to cleanup costs complicate negotiations between the
remaining parties. 77 It can be more difficult to settle claims in cases
where some of the responsible parties are facing bankruptcy because
other responsible parties do not want to pay for the insolvent party’s
share of the cleanup costs. 78
The lower courts weigh the competing interests of the laws
inconsistently, with conflicting results for debtors. Some courts give
certain deference to environmental laws, while others favor
bankruptcy provisions. 79 There is also a complex middle ground that
further confuses the issue. 80
D. Judicial History
1. Supreme Court
Ohio v. Kovacs was the first case in which the Supreme Court
tackled the bankruptcy discharge as it relates to environmental

75

U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 14.
In the last 10 years, litigation-related expenses have comprised up to 23% of
total EPA expenditures. Id. at 12–14.
77
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, LITIGATION HAS DECREASED
AND EPA NEEDS BETTER INFORMATION ON SITE CLEANUP AND COST ISSUES TO
ESTIMATE FUTURE PROGRAM FUNDING REQUIREMENTS 34 (2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09656.pdf (citing reports where the EPA rejected
settlement proposals from minimally responsible parties where bankrupt owners
were largely responsible for site contamination but were unable to pay).
78
Id. at 6.
79
August, supra note 1, at 73.
80
Id.
76
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injunctions. 81 When this landmark case was decided, it was interpreted
as a blanket edict that polluting debtors could discharge environmental
obligations in bankruptcy. 82 Over time, however, Kovacs has raised
more questions than it has answered.
In Kovacs, the State of Ohio sought a declaration from the
bankruptcy court that the debtor’s obligation to clean up a
contaminated site was not dischargeable in bankruptcy.83 The debtor,
the principal shareholder of the polluting corporation, had previously
signed a stipulation and judgment requiring him to remove specified
wastes from the property. 84 When the debtor failed to comply with the
injunction, the State appointed a receiver to take possession of the
site. 85 Prior to completion of the cleanup, the debtor filed for personal
bankruptcy under Chapter 7, precluding the State from enforcing its
environmental laws against him. 86 The Supreme Court held that
because the debtor’s cleanup duty had been reduced to a monetary
obligation, it was a liability on a claim that was dischargeable under
the Bankruptcy Code. 87
The Kovacs decision most importantly stands for the
proposition that a debtor cannot maintain an ongoing nuisance in
direct violation of state environmental laws. 88 The state can exercise
its regulatory powers and force compliance with its laws, even if the
debtor must expend money to comply. 89 Under Kovacs, what the state
cannot do is force the debtor to pay money to the state; at that point,

81

469 U.S. 274 (1986).
See Richard Allen, Dumping Waste, Discharging Debts: Ohio v. Kovacs
(Kovacs II), 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 661, 668 (1986); Jeff J. Marwill, Ohio v. Kovacs:
Financial Freedom for Bankrupt Polluters, 34 DEPAUL L. REV. 1069, 1079 (1985).
83
Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 276–77.
84
Id. at 276.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 276 n.1. The bankruptcy court stayed the State’s request to discover the
debtor’s income and assets.
87
Id. at 283.
88
Jason S. Brookner, Environmental Claims in Bankruptcy: An Overview, 112
BANKING L.J. 124, 132 (1995).
89
Id.
82
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the state is no longer acting in its role as regulator, and it is instead
acting as a creditor. 90
The Kovacs Court expressly limited its holding in several
91
ways, making it difficult to consider as precedent for future cases.
Several issues were not decided: whether a monetary obligation
imposed prior to bankruptcy was dischargeable; whether the
consequences would be different had a receiver not been appointed to
facilitate the injunction; or whether any environmental claims at all are
dischargeable. 92 The Kovacs Court noted that even if an injunction
does not facially require payment of money, it still may present a
“claim.” 93 In particular, the Court did not address the issue of whether
an injunction against further pollution is dischargeable. 94
Kovacs fails to address the situations in which an injunction is
not automatically dischargeable. The Supreme Court has since never
addressed the specific issues on which it declined to comment in
Kovacs. The limited holding in Kovacs has befuddled courts struggling
to use any shred of guiding light from the Supreme Court in their
respective analyses. 95
Courts have struggled to identify a uniform legacy for Kovacs.
In Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection, the Supreme Court interpreted dicta in
Kovacs to mean that the abandonment of property in bankruptcy is
90

Id.
Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 284.
92
Id. at 284–85 (“[W]e do not address what the legal consequences would have
been had Kovacs taken bankruptcy before a receiver had been appointed and a
trustee had been designated with the usual duties of a bankruptcy trustee . . . . [W]e
do not hold that the injunction against bringing further toxic wastes on the premises
or against any conduct that will contribute to the pollution of the site or the State's
waters is dischargeable in bankruptcy; we here address . . . only the affirmative duty
to clean up the site and the duty to pay money to that end.”).
93
Id. at 274.
94
Francis E. Goodwyn, Claims Estimation and the Use of the “Cleanup Trust”
in Environmental Bankruptcy Cases, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 769, 776 (2001).
95
Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 284–85; see In re Alongi, 272 B.R. 148, 156 (Bankr. D.
Md. 2001) (citing Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 284); see also Goodwyn, supra note 94, at
776–77 (discussing Kovacs and how the Supreme Court limited its holding to the
facts of the particular case, rather than disposing of potential issues).
91
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subject to environmental laws. 96 The subject property in Midlantic
was uncontestedly burdensome and not of value to the bankrupt
estate. 97 The bankruptcy court allowed the trustee in bankruptcy to
abandon the contaminated site, even though the debtor had done
nothing to remediate the facility. 98 The Third Circuit reversed, and the
Supreme Court affirmed. 99
Midlantic seems to advocate a case-by-case approach in which
courts must balance the environmental violation’s threat to public
health against the estate’s ability to comply with environmental
laws. 100 Although the Midlantic Court dealt with abandonment of
debtor property in the bankruptcy estate, and not the discharge of a
claim for liability post-bankruptcy as in Kovacs, the underlying
question was the same: who will pay the cleanup costs for the
contaminated property? 101
2. The Circuit Split
The Supreme Court did not, in either Kovacs or Midlantic,
address the discrete issue of when a claim arises for the purposes of
bankruptcy. In In re Chateaugay Corp., the Second Circuit considered
what constituted a claim in the context of a bankrupt debtor who

96

474 U.S. 494, 500–01 (1986) (quoting Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 285) (anyone in
possession of polluted property “must comply with the environmental laws of the
[s]tate”).
97
Midlantic, 494 U.S. at 502.
98
Id. at 498 n.3.
99
Id. at 498.
100
Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 4, at 362–69. Lower courts are divided on
how to treat the outcome of Midlantic. Some hold that Midlantic requires the trustee
to bring contaminated property into complete compliance with all environmental
laws before abandonment. See In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 Bankr. 943, 946–47 n.1
(Bankr. W. D. Mich. 1987). Others interpret limiting language in Midlantic to mean
that the exception applies only where there is an imminent danger to public health
and safety. In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 856 F.2d 12, 15 (1988); see also In re Purco,
Inc., 76 Bankr. 523, 533 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987); In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65
Bankr. 268, 271–72 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
101
Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 4, at 369.
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owned and operated literally dozens of hazardous waste sites. 102 The
Second Circuit held that the EPA’s costs of responding to the
hazardous waste situations, even those not yet addressed at the time of
the bankruptcy, involved claims. 103 As such, the EPA was required to
file a proof of claim for each of the sites and stand in line with the
other creditors in the bankruptcy. 104 With respect to injunctions
requiring the debtor to clean up the waste sites, the Second Circuit
made the distinction between seeking reimbursement for cleanup and
accepting payment as an alternative to continued pollution. 105 The
Second Circuit held:
[A] cleanup order that accomplishes the dual objectives of
removing accumulated wastes and stopping or ameliorating
ongoing pollution emanating from such wastes is not a
dischargeable claim. It is true that, if in lieu of such an order,
EPA had undertaken the removal itself and sued for the
response costs, its action would have both removed the
accumulated waste and prevented continued pollution . . . But
an order to clean up a site, to the extent that it imposes
obligations distinct from any obligation to stop or ameliorate
ongoing pollution, is a “claim” if the creditor obtaining the
order had the option, which CERCLA confers, to do the
cleanup work itself and sue for response costs, thereby
converting the injunction into a monetary obligation. 106
Finding the logic of the Second Circuit persuasive, the Third
Circuit held in In re Torwico Electronics, Inc. that a cleanup order
entered after the bankruptcy bar date is not dischargeable. 107 In
Torwico, the Chapter 11 debtor had owned, but no longer possessed,
the polluted property. The Third Circuit held that the debtor’s
102

944 F.2d 997, 1006 (2d Cir. 1991).
Id.
104
Id. at 1004.
105
Id. at 1008.
106
Id.
107
8 F.3d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1046 (1994).
103
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obligations under the state’s administrative order requiring the debtor
to clean up hazardous waste on the polluted property was not a claim
under the Bankruptcy Code. 108 The debtor claimed that because it no
longer had possession of the cleanup site, it was no longer maintaining
a nuisance or participating in or responsible for the ongoing release of
hazardous chemicals at the site. 109 The Third Circuit held that
although the state did not have a right to payment, it had the right to
force the debtor to comply with existing environmental laws, even if
the debtor expended money to comply. 110
The Third Circuit centered its analysis on the State of New
Jersey’s regulatory role. The court found that if the State could force
the debtor to pay money to the State, it would cease to be merely a
regulator and would take on the role of creditor. 111 So while forcing
compliance is within the power of the State as regulator, including
forcing the debtor to expend money to comply with court orders, the
State cannot force the debtor to pay money directly to the state. 112
Interestingly, the Court held that the cleanup obligation was not a right
to payment, even though that option was available to the State. 113 The
State could have, under the Act, cleaned up the hazardous waste and
then sought reimbursement, which would be a judicial right to
payment. 114
The Third Circuit rejected the debtor’s contention that Kovacs
applied to the cleanup obligation, agreeing with the state that Kovacs
was not applicable because the state was not seeking a money
judgment, but only seeking to remedy the ongoing pollution by forcing
108

Id. at 148.
Id. at 151.
110
Id. at 150.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 150.
113
Id. at 151 n.6 (“The parties dispute[d] whether, if the state has an ‘alternate
payment remedy’ the order becomes a ‘claim.’”); see In re Chateaugay Corp., 944
F.2d 997, 1008 (“[T]o the extent that [an order] imposes obligations distinct from
any obligation to stop or ameliorate ongoing pollution, [it] is a ‘claim’ if the creditor
obtaining the order had the option . . . to do the cleanup work itself and sue for
response costs”).
114
Torwico, 8 F.3d at 151.
109
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the debtor to clean up the site. 115 Under New Jersey law, the
environmental obligations of the polluting company ran with the waste
and not the land. 116 Thus, the debtor company was responsible for the
cleanup even though it was no longer in possession of the land. 117
The Sixth Circuit has held oppositely. In United States v.
Whizco, Inc., the government sought to enjoin the defendant, a coal
company, to obey orders of the Secretary of the Interior requiring the
defendants to satisfy their statutory obligation to reclaim their
abandoned coal mine. 118 The court held that the former operator of the
coal mine was required to reclaim the abandoned site, even though the
mine had been liquidated, but made the point of distinguishing
enforcement obligations that required performance from those that
were monetary obligations: “to the extent that fulfilling his obligation
to reclaim the site would force the defendant to spend money, the
obligation [i]s a liability on a claim as defined by the Bankruptcy
Code.” 119 Whizco suggests that all claims in which the defendant must
spend money are rights to payment as defined in section 101(5). 120
The Whizco position favors debtors in bankruptcy, because it
follows “fresh start” principles. As such, Whizco has been argued
many times by bankrupt debtors trying to resolve environmental
claims in court. 121 However, most courts have declined to follow the
Sixth Circuit’s distinction between money claims and injunctive
relief. 122
115

Id. at 149.
Id.
117
Id.
118
841 F.2d 147, 147 (6th Cir. 1988).
119
Id. at 151.
120
Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).
121
See, e.g. Kennedy v. Medicap Pharmacies, Inc., 267 F.3d 493, 496 (6th Cir.
2001) (distinguishing Whizco’s reclamation order from a covenant not to compete);
City of Toledo v. Rayford, No. L-97-1310, 1998 WL 230450, at *2 (Ohio App. 6
Dist. May 1, 1998).
122
United States v. Hubler, 117 B.R. 160 (W.D. Pa. 1990), aff’d, 928 F.2d
1131 (3d Cir. 1991) (cessation order demanded performance, not payment, and thus,
the obligations were not “claims” within meaning of Bankruptcy Code); In re
Chateaugay Corp., 112 B.R. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d, 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991)
(“claims for injunctive relief for which creditors had option of converting injunction
116
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3. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit has previously considered environmental
claims in bankruptcy, with varying results. In In re Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company (Chicago I) 123 and
In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company
(Chicago II), the Seventh Circuit affirmed the discharge of CERCLA
claims. 124 The court held that a claim arises for bankruptcy purposes
when the claimant can “tie the bankruptcy debtor to a known release
of a hazardous substance which this potential claimant knows will lead
to CERCLA response costs.” 125 Thus, in Chicago I, because the
relevant authority waited to file a claim until four years after the
bankruptcy approval date, the claim was discharged in bankruptcy. 126
The discharge was affirmed in Chicago II, where the court found that
sufficient information existed, had the plaintiff sought it out, to give at
least constructive knowledge that it possessed a CERCLA claim prior
to and during the bankruptcy. 127
The Seventh Circuit held broadly that cost incurred to comply
with an equitable cleanup order is not equivalent to the right to
payment. 128 In AM International, Inc. v. Datacard Corp, the Seventh
Circuit considered whether a cleanup order under RCRA was
converted to a monetary obligation. 129 Because only “rights to

into right to monetary compensation, as could be done if cleanup were performed
because of potentially responsible party’s failure to do so, constituted claims
dischargeable in bankruptcy”).
123
974 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1992).
124
3 F.3d 200 (7th Cir. 1993).
125
Chicago I, 974 F.2d at 786.
126
Id.
127
Chicago II, 3 F.3d at 203, 207. Prior to the confirmation of the bankruptcy,
the EPA launched a massive investigation of the site, and a state-commissioned
study detailing the site's problems was published. Id.
128
AM Int’l, Inc. v. Datacard Corp, 106 F.3d 1342 (7th Cir. 1997).
129
Id. at 1348.
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payment” are dischargeable “claims” for bankruptcy purposes, the
RCRA injunction was not a claim. 130
In In re CMC Heartland Partners, the Seventh Circuit found in
favor of the EPA because the CERCLA provision involved created a
claim “running with the land.” 131 The court found that a “statutory
obligation attached to current ownership of the land survives
bankruptcy.” 132 The court distinguished “claims” in bankruptcy,
noting that “[t]o the extent [the relevant federal statutory sections]
require a person to pay money today because of acts before or during
the reorganization proceedings, CERCLA creates a ‘claim’ in
bankruptcy.” 133 Thus, the court avoided the possibility that a cleanup
order would be a response to an ongoing threat, and not just a
repackaged claim for damages. 134
II. UNITED STATES V. APEX OIL CO., INC.
In U.S. v. Apex Oil Company, Inc., the United States, seeking
injunctive relief under the endangerment provision of RCRA, brought
an action against Apex Oil Company, Inc. (“Apex”). 135 Apex was a
successor company to Clark Oil and Refining Corporation. 136 Fifteen
130

Id.; see Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996) (RCRA does not
allow a party to clean up site and sue for response costs in lieu of seeking an
injunction).
131
966 F.2d 1143, 1147 (7th Cir. 1992). CMC is the successor case to Chicago
I, 974 F.2d 775.
132
CMC, 966 F.2d at 1147.
133
Id. at 1146.
134
Id. at 1147.
135
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6987, 6973 (2010); U.S. v. Apex Oil Co., Inc.,
579 F.3d 734, 734 (7th Cir. 2009).
136
Clark Oil Refining Corporation (“Clark Oil”) bought the Hartford Refinery
in 1967. Apex Oil Company (“Apex Oil”) was a general partnership formed in 1979.
In 1981, Clark Oil was merged into Apex Acquisition, Inc. and subsequently
changed its name to Clark Oil and Refining Corporation (“Clark/Apex”). In 1987,
Apex Oil and most of its subsidiaries, including Clark/Apex, filed for protection
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. In 1988, Clark/Apex sold the Hartford
Refinery to yet another incarnation of Clark Oil and Refining Corporation. Apex Oil
Company, Inc. was incorporated in 1989 and merged into Apex Oil (“Apex”). Apex
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years after the company’s successful Chapter 11 reorganization, the
government brought an action against the successor company for
groundwater contamination at the site of a previously owned oil
refinery in Hartford, Illinois. 137 After a seventeen-day bench trial, the
district judge found that millions of gallons of oil constituting a
“hydrocarbon plume” were trapped underground at the site. 138 The
pollution contaminated the groundwater and emitted fumes into the
surrounding area, creating hazards to health and to the environment. 139
The district judge found that the evidence presented established
Apex’s liability and that the injunction was appropriate. 140
The question brought before the Seventh Circuit was whether
the claim had been discharged in Apex’s previous bankruptcy and
therefore could not serve as the basis for the lawsuit. 141 The principal
issue addressed by the Seventh Circuit was whether the government’s
claim to an injunction was discharged in bankruptcy, precluding the
claim from being brought in another lawsuit.142 At the time the
Government instituted the cause of action, Apex no longer owned the
property, engaged in refining, or had the in-house capability to clean
up the contaminated site. 143 Apex argued that because it would be
unable to fulfill its environmental obligations without payment of
approximately $150 million dollars to an outside contractor, and
therefore the equitable remedy had been reduced to payment, it was a
dischargeable claim. 144
is a successor-by-merger to both Clark Oil and Clark/Apex, who collectively owned
the refinery between September 29, 1967, and November 20, 1988. U.S. v. Apex Oil
Co., Inc., No. 05-CV-242-DRH, 2008 WL 2945402, at *1–2 (S.D. Ill. July 28,
2008).
137
United States v. Apex Oil Co., Inc., 579 F.3d 734, 735 (7th Cir. 2009).
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
United States v. Apex Oil Co., Inc., No. 05-CV-242-DRH, 2008 WL
2945402, at *1 (S.D. Ill. July 28, 2008).
141
Apex, 579 F.3d at 735.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 736.
144
Notably, the government had initially asked for injunctions under either the
Clean Water Act or CERCLA but changed positions when confronted with Apex’s
bankruptcy discharge defense. Id. at 737.
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Judge Posner, writing for the court, explained that the
definition of a “claim” in section 101(5)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code
includes “a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance”
only if the breach “gives rise to a right to payment.” 145 The critical
inquiry for the statutory interpretation is the meaning of “gives rise to
a right to payment.” 146 The Seventh Circuit read the plain language of
the statute to mean that if the equitable remedy was unobtainable and
the holder of an equitable claim could obtain a money judgment
instead, the claim would give rise to a right to payment and would
hence be dischargeable. 147
The Seventh Circuit compared the cleanup injunction to other
equitable remedies that give rise to rights to payment because the
claimant would be entitled to a money judgment, and it noted that
certain equitable remedies like backpay orders and orders of equitable
restitution would be dischargeable if not for explicit statutory authority
to the contrary. 148 Accordingly, only two types of injunctions give rise
to an alternate right to payment: (1) injunctions that are no longer
capable of performance, such as an injunction to do something that is
no longer possible and (2) injunctions that actually call for the
payment of money. 149 The Court specifically rejected the notion that
equitable remedies are orders to act and are never orders to pay. 150
In contrast to equitable remedies that may be reduced to money
judgments, the government’s RCRA claim does not entitle the plaintiff
to demand payment of cleanup costs in lieu of the defendant cleaning
up the site, either by doing the cleanup itself or by paying a third
party. 151 Because RCRA does not authorize any form of monetary
145

11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B); Apex, 579 F.3d at 735.
Apex, 579 F.3d at 736.
147
Id.
148
Id.; see In re Davis, 3 F.3d 113, 116 (5th Cir. 1993) (a money judgment to
the value of the equitable remedy or claim is a right to receive payment and is
dischargeable in bankruptcy); UFG, LLC v. Sw. Corp., 848 N.E.2d 353, 363, 365
(Ind. App. 2006) (decree for specific performance that could not be performed and
thus entitled the plaintiff to a money judgment was dischargeable).
149
Apex, 579 F.3d at 736.
150
Id.
151
Id.
146
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relief, the Seventh Circuit concluded that that the cleanup order at
issue could not be deemed a right to payment. 152
The RCRA provision that was the basis of the government’s
equitable claim did not entitle the government to a demand for any
monetary relief, although it did entitle the plaintiff to equitable relief
in the form of money. 153 As such, the government’s equitable claim
entitled the government to require Apex to clean up the site at Apex’s
expense. 154
The Seventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc. to support its interpretation that section
6973(a) did not authorize monetary relief. 155 Meghrig interpreted
RCRA’s companion provision authorizing private suits as not
authorizing monetary relief. 156 The relevant language from the two
statutes is identical. 157 The Seventh Circuit concluded on this basis
that the government’s equitable claim allowed the court to compel the
defendant to clean up the contaminated site, and nothing more. 158
The court also rejected Apex’s second argument, that all
equitable decrees requiring payment for compliance are money claims
and are therefore dischargeable. 159 The court found the position to be
inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code that creates only the limited
right to the discharge of equitable claims. 160 As such, the cost to the
defendant is not equivalent to a right to payment for the plaintiff. 161
152

Id. at 736–37.
Id. at 737.
154
Id.
155
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2) (2006); Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S.
479, 483–87 (1996); Apex, 579 F.3d at 737.
156
Apex, 579 F.3d at 737.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B); Apex, 579 F.3d at 737.
161
Apex, 579 F.3d at 737; see AM Int’l, Inc. v. Datacard Corp., 106 F.3d 1342,
1348 (7th Cir. 1997); In re Torwico Elecs., Inc., 8 F.3d 146, 150 (3d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 511 U.S. 1046 (1994); In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143, 1145–
47 (7th Cir. 1992); In re Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 805 F.2d 1175, 1186–87
(5th Cir. 1986); Penn Terra, Ltd. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 733 F.2d 267, 278–79 (3d
Cir. 1984); U.S. v. Hubler, 117 B.R. 160, 164 and n.1 (W.D. Pa. 1990), aff’d, 928
153
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The Court explained, “[a]lmost every equitable decree imposes a cost
on the defendant, whether the decree requires him to do something, as
in this case, or, as is more common, to refrain from doing
something.” 162
The Seventh Circuit distinguished Ohio v. Kovacs, in which
the receiver that had been appointed was seeking money for the
injunction instead of an order for cleanup. 163 The claim was a right to
payment. 164 Here, the government was not seeking money, and the
injunction therefore did not entitle a right to payment that would be
dischargeable in bankruptcy. 165 In Apex, the EPA merely sought
cleanup of the contaminated site, whereas the receiver in Kovacs
sought money for cleanup. 166 The court dismissed the notion that the
two were synonymous. 167
III. ANALYSIS
Apex’s argument failed because it attempted to distinguish the
environmental injunction under RCRA from all other equitable
claims. 168 Under the current statutory makeup of the Bankruptcy
Code, however, distinguishing between equitable claims is simply not
possible. 169 The Seventh Circuit found definitively:

F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1991); In re Chateaugay Corp., 112 B.R. 513, 523–24 (S.D.N.Y.
1990), aff’d, 944 F. 2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991).
162
Apex, 579 F.3d at 737.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id. The Seventh Circuit also rejected Apex’s alternative argument that the
injunction itself is vague and violates Rule 65(d) of the civil rules requiring that an
injunction “state its terms specifically” and “describe in reasonable detail—and not
by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or
required.” Apex, 579 F.3d at 739. The issue is not addressed in this Note.
168
Id. at 736.
169
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).
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The distinctions that Apex suggests to limit the scope of a
position that it realizes is untenable (that all equitable claims
are dischargeable in bankruptcy in the absence of a specific
exception in the Code)—between injunctions to do and
injunctions not to do, between injunctions that require major
expenditures and those that require minor ones, between
injunctions that the defendant can comply with internally and
injunctions that it has to hire an independent contractor in
order to achieve compliance with—are arbitrary. 170
The root arbitrariness of Apex’s position is that neither the
Bankruptcy Code nor RCRA make any legal distinction for the
manner in which the cleanup occurs. 171 The Seventh Circuit
underscored that adopting Apex’s position would encourage polluters
to remain without internal cleanup capacity. 172 The cleanup costs exist
whether they are paid for by the polluter or someone else. As the
polluter most responsible for the environmental damage, Apex’s
cleanup obligation withstands bankruptcy. 173 Were the court to adopt
Apex’s position, it is unlikely that the state could effectively enforce
its laws. 174 The argument that any order requiring the debtor to expend
money creates a dischargeable claim is untenable, because virtually all
enforcement actions impose some cost on the violator. 175
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that all equitable decrees impose
costs on the defendants, and that discharge generally must be limited
to cases where the claim gives rise to a right to payment. 176 This
position is consistent with the Seventh Circuit’s previous decisions
regarding the dischargeability of environmental claims in bankruptcy.
The court clearly followed its own precedent in In re CMC Heartland
170

Apex, 579 F.3d at 738.
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 737.
174
Id.
175
See In re Torwico Elecs., Inc., 8 F.3d 146, 150 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 511 U.S. 1046 (1994).
176
Apex, 579 F.3d at 738.
171
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Partners, which held that the statutory cleanup obligation that attached
to current ownership of the land survived bankruptcy, 177 and AM
International, Inc. v. Datacard Corp., where that cost incurred to
comply with a RCRA injunction was not equivalent to the right to
payment. 178
The Seventh Circuit’s reliance on its own precedent is
indicative of the lack of guidance from higher authority, namely the
Supreme Court or Congress. While the Seventh Circuit correctly
interpreted the statutory language, other Circuits are still relying on the
spotty lineage of cases following Kovacs to make conflicting decisions
about the dischargeability of environmental claims.
The Seventh Circuit’s reliance on its own precedent, and
similar lines of cases in other circuits, indicates that there is no unified
approach to environmental claims in bankruptcy. The Seventh
Circuit’s analysis is supported by some of the circuits, but starkly
contrasted by the Sixth. Beginning with the latter, the Seventh Circuit
explicitly rejected Apex’s attempt to support its position with United
States v. Whizco, Inc. 179
Whizco suggests that all claims where the defendant must
spend money in order to comply with the court’s orders are rights to
payment. 180 The question presented in Whizco—whether the discharge
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code apply to mandatory injunctive
relief that cannot be performed personally and would require a debtor
in a chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy to spend money—is comparable
to that in Apex. 181 The facts of Whizco are also similar to those in
Apex, as the debtor in Whizco had surrendered the property in
question, as well as all the mining equipment, in his bankruptcy. 182
The debtor no longer had the physical ability to perform the
reclamation nor the right to enter the polluted site. 183 Further, the
177
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debtor lacked the financial ability to post bond or to hire a third party
to perform the cleanup work. 184
The Sixth Circuit relied on Kovacs in holding that the debtor’s
obligation to comply with the injunction was discharged in
bankruptcy. 185 According to the court, the petitioner in Whizco
essentially sought from the respondent debtor only a monetary
payment and that such a required payment was a liability on a claim
that was dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code. 186 Like Kovacs,
where the State of Ohio was essentially trying to obtain a money
payment from the debtor, the debtor in Whizco could not personally
clean up the waste he wrongfully released into the environment. 187 As
such, the Sixth Circuit determined that the redress sought by the
government was actually a money claim and dischargeable in
bankruptcy. 188
The Sixth Circuit rejected Whizco, Inc.’s argument that an
injunctive order should be discharged only when the government has
an alternative right to payment of money in lieu of compelling the
operator or his agent to perform his reclamation duties. 189 The Sixth
Circuit held:
Although the terms of the injunction would not require the
payment of money, to the extent that the injunction were to be
effective, it would. . . . Thus, when we look at the substance
of what the plaintiff seeks, rather than the form of the relief
sought, we see that the plaintiff is really seeking payment. 190
The Whizco court determined that money payment was a claim,
regardless of the form of the court order demanding cleanup.191 The
184
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distinction between form and substance makes practical sense. An
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code that turns on the debtor’s
financial reality is preferable for debtors who are legally liable but
practically unable to pay for the environmental cleanup that would
inevitably be performed by government agencies.
The Sixth Circuit applied Kovacs more literally than the
Seventh Circuit, finding that the substance of the claim—namely, the
money expense—governs over the form of the court order. 192 While
most courts begin inquiry into environmental matters in bankruptcy
with a discussion of Kovacs, the Seventh Circuit stepped away from
that approach. 193 Instead, the Seventh Circuit turned to the statutory
language of RCRA and the Bankruptcy Code. 194
The key difference between the Sixth and Seventh Circuits’
study of Kovacs is that the Sixth Circuit interpreted the case without
respect to the appointment of the receiver, 195 while the Seventh Circuit
in Apex found that the appointment of a receiver transferred the power
to make money claims out of the hands of the debtor, and therefore
was inapplicable to the present case. 196 Had the Whizco court
considered the receiver’s role as intermediary seeking payment for the
environmental cleanup, the court may have come to the same
conclusion as the Seventh Circuit.
The Seventh Circuit’s analysis mirrors that of the Third Circuit
in In re Torwico Electronics, Inc. 197 In Torwico, the court applied an
environmental law similar to the RCRA provision that limits claims to
injunctive relief. 198 The Third Circuit reasoned that because the New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and Energy
(NJDEPE) could not force the debtor to pay money to the State, the
cleanup costs were not a claim in bankruptcy. 199 NJDEPE had no right
192
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to payment, because its authority was limited to enforcement of the
laws requiring the debtor to clean up the hazardous wastes for which it
was responsible under state law. 200 The court in Torwico stated that
much like the remedy at issue in Apex, “it is clear that the state
demanded not that Torwico pay money over to the state, but rather that
it take action to ameliorate ongoing hazard.” 201
Both the Sixth Circuit’s substance/form distinction and the
Seventh Circuit’s determination that an injunction is not a universal
right to payment have significant policy implications. If a debtor’s
environmental obligations are dischargeable, as advocated by the Sixth
Circuit, the entire burden of reclaiming and cleaning up the polluted
sites falls on the government. 202 Such policy decisions are the
responsibility of Congress, which could easily modify the Bankruptcy
Code with a specific provision stating that a debtor may not discharge
his cleanup obligations. While a statutory mandate requiring
compliance with environmental acts would further the aims of
environmental policy, it would be devastating to both debtors and
other creditors in bankruptcy. Environmental injunctions and cleanup
orders often amount to exponential costs 203 that, if allowed to take
administrative priority, would mean that fewer debtors would be able
to reorganize and more would be forced to liquidate. 204 Further, in
liquidation, the high costs of environmental obligations would leave
little if anything for the debtor’s unsecured creditors. 205
The relatively simple legal issue in Apex implicates
complicated equitable principles in bankruptcy and environmental law.
Although the Seventh Circuit was correct in affirming the injunction
against Apex, the case highlights several of the issues that
continuously plague polluters entering bankruptcy or those who have
already gone through bankruptcy.
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First, the Apex holding puts the post-bankruptcy debtor in the
position where they can be blindsided by astronomical cleanup
costs. 206 Bankruptcy courts confirm only those bankruptcy plans that
feasibly pay all preferred creditors and claims, and then discharge the
remaining debt. 207 A debtor must be aware of all claims, potential
liabilities, and debts that exist or potentially exist prior to the
bankruptcy in order to plan reorganization. 208 Debtors cannot
anticipate a complete discharge if they do not know the status of their
potential environmental liability. 209 Without an accurate forecast of
potential liabilities, debtors may end up grossly miscalculating their
assets.
Thus, even the best-intentioned debtor can fall prey to a huge
claim under the expectation of a complete discharge. Apex argued that
had it known in 1986 that it would be liable for $150 million in
cleanup costs, it would have had to undergo a Chapter 7 liquidation
rather than a Chapter 11 reorganization, because it could not have
successfully reorganized with the additional, non-dischargeable
debt. 210 Without a successor or surviving entity to take over liability
for the cleanup, the full expense of the operation would fall on the
government.
Of course, environmental statutes such as CERCLA and
RCRA hold parties accountable regardless of financial status. 211 The
concept of the PRP mandates joint and several liability for all
responsible parties without reference to business organization. 212
More troubling for the debtor, Apex provides little hope that
debtors may ever be able to discharge liability for RCRA claims. By
simply structuring the cause of action as a RCRA injunctive suit rather
than attempting to obtain a money judgment under CERCLA or a
different statute, government agencies can ensure debtor compliance,
206
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even where it may not be the most equitable outcome for the parties
involved. In Apex, the government originally filed its claim under
CERCLA and the Clean Water Act, but repleaded when confronted
with Apex’s bankruptcy defense. 213 A claim under the relevant
CERCLA provision could be converted to a money judgment, which is
a claim for bankruptcy purposes. 214 The corresponding RCRA claim
does not have a money judgment as an available remedy. 215 Filing the
cleanup action under RCRA essentially guaranteed that Apex would
not be discharged of liability.
Based on statutory purpose alone, CERCLA is a more
appropriate statute under which to file than RCRA because its
purposes are cleanup and remediation instead of prevention of future
pollution. 216 RCRA’s limited remedial structure can be somewhat
explained by the correspondingly broad citizen suit provisions. 217
Further, unlike CERCLA, which imposes broad liability on both the
current owner of the polluted land as well as the responsible parties,
RCRA aims to reduce environmental damages by regulating potential
polluters. 218 Because it failed to overcome the issue in litigation, 219
Apex’s attempt to avoid liability for the cleanup was doomed from the
start.
The Seventh Circuit’s holding in Apex is an unpleasant
precedent for polluters. Although the government may file RCRA
213
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claims, Congress intended that RCRA enforcement be a partnership
between state and federal governments, with the state taking primary
responsibility for implementation. 220 The government selectively filed
a claim under RCRA when confronted with Apex’s bankruptcy
defense. 221 The resulting Seventh Circuit decision gives the
government carte blanche to shoehorn responsive claims into what is
meant to be a preventative statute, for the purpose of avoiding
bankruptcy defenses.
Although it will not resolve the conflicting principles between
bankruptcy and environmental law, decreasing the number of bankrupt
parties saddled with environmental liability would serve to partially
ameliorate the problem. The EPA reported in 2005 that implementing
a 1980 statutory mandate under CERCLA requiring businesses
handling hazardous substances to provide assurance of their financial
responsibility could help reduce the risk overall that companies
entering bankruptcy would be responsible for costly environmental
cleanup. 222 This would also reduce the risk that the general public
would have to assume the financial responsibility of the cleanup
costs. 223
CONCLUSION
Although denying that a $150 million cleanup order is a “right
to payment”—as the Seventh Circuit did in Apex—may seem initially
adverse to the traditional prospect of a dischargeable claim, the
Seventh Circuit was correct to affirm the district’s decision for at least
two reasons. First, the Bankruptcy Code and relevant RCRA
220
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provisions are blind to the financial status of a debtor in what is a
purely equitable claim. Second, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Kovacs does not provide a blueprint for this type of environmental
injunction in a bankruptcy case.
While the Seventh Circuit’s decision was legally correct, there
are equitable concerns that span beyond the simple statutory analysis
of the Bankruptcy Code. The injunction against Apex forces the
company to spend vastly outside of its fiscal bankruptcy plan. As such,
the debtor did not receive a “fresh start” in this case. In a cross section
of law where one party gets the short end of the stick, the debtor
company in this case certainly received just that. Apex highlights the
tension between the competing purposes of bankruptcy and
environmental law. Until the issue is further treated by either the
Supreme Court or by Congress, the status of environmental claims in
bankruptcy will remain uncertain.
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